New Directions for Trust in the Certificate Authority Ecosystem by Malchow, Jan-Ole et al.
New Directions for Trust in the Certificate Authority Ecosystem
Jan-Ole Malchow, Benjamin Güldenring, Volker Roth
<firstname>.<lastname>@fu-berlin.de
Freie Universität Berlin
Abstract—Many of the benefits we derive from the Internet
require trust in the authenticity of HTTPS connections.
Unfortunately, the public key certification ecosystem that
underwrites this trust has failed us on numerous occasions.
Towards an exploration of the root causes we present an
update to the common knowledge about the Certificate Au-
thority (CA) ecosystem. Based on our findings the certificate
ecosystem currently undergoes a drastic transformation. Big
steps towards ubiquitous encryption were made, however,
on the expense of trust for authentication of communication
partners. Furthermore we describe systemic problems rooted
in misaligned incentives between players in the ecosystem.
We depict that proposed security extensions do not correctly
realign these incentives. As such we argue that it is worth
considering alternative methods of authentication. As a first
step in this direction we propose an insurance-based mech-
anism and we demonstrate that it is technically feasible.
1. Introduction
The Internet connects billions of individuals and count-
less organizations who use it every day for purposes rang-
ing from mundane activities to transactions that warrant
utmost confidentiality and integrity. Many of the benefits
that Internet users enjoy hinge on trusting HTTPS connec-
tions and thus the Certificate Authority (CA) ecosystem.
We argue that the CA ecosystem has served us well
over the years but is close to its end of life now. Obviously
certificates are deeply integrated into technology in the
field and will not vanish shortly. However, the trust to use
them for authentication purposes is decreasing. We back
this claim with two arguments. Our first argument is that
the ecosystem underwent drastic changes in the last four
years. These changes basically transformed the CA market
into a gratis market in conjunction with a strong degree of
centralization. On the one hand these changes increased
the number of encrypted connections but on the other hand
reduced the trust we can place on certificates. Our second
argument is that even if the market still exists the inherent
incentives are misaligned from a trust perspective. As a
result we argue that it is worth considering alternative
means of CA ecosystem variants.
Towards our first argument we present numbers from
Google’s Certificate Authority Server and an updated anal-
ysis of Durumeric et al. “Analysis of the HTTPS Certificate
Ecosystem” from 2013 [5]. Towards our second argument
we follow and extend Arnbak et al. [1] who already stated
that CAs are “too big to fail.” We concur based on our
own findings, but the underlying mechanics deserve more
scrutiny. Existing efforts focused on informing decision
making but overlooked the role of incentives. In this
paper, we discuss the CA ecosystem from the perspective
of incentives, striving to determine the effectiveness of
checks and balances within that ecosystem. Based thereof,
we argue that existing efforts meant to improve the CA
ecosystem leave incentives largely as they are. The implied
conclusion is that existing proposals to improve the CA
ecosystem might not be as effective in practice as we hope
them to be as seen from a purely technical viewpoint.
Based on this foundation, we designed an alternative
model that we call Connection Insurances (CI), and a proof
of concept implementation. A key difference between this
model and prior work is that it alters the roles of the
involved parties and the allocation of risks and rewards
among them. Thereby, we manipulate the incentives of
the actors in the ecosystem in order to adjust the system
parameters. In a nutshell, insurers assume the role of
certification authorities. Insurers are bound contractually
to pay out benefits to Internet users in case they provide
misleading information. We demonstrate that our design
is technically feasible. On the flip side, we assume that
Internet users pay for their security in the form of insurance
premiums. Many readers will contend that this assumption
is invalid in practice. However, our proposal is still a first
step towards an alternative whose justification is not purely
a technical one. We aim at demonstrating that a solution is
possible by orchestrating well understood building blocks.
If we limit ourselves to purely technical considerations
then we may end up with no sustainable solution at all.
This, however, is an undesirable outcome. Evaluation and
analysis of our proof of concept implementation shows that
our design is technically feasible. Our proof of concept re-
quires only straightforward applications of well-understood
cryptographic techniques, and is compatible to existing
systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In § 2
we present an updated analysis of the CA ecosystem. In
§ 3 we discuss general misalignments in the CA system. In
§ 4 we describe the design with which we aim to mitigate
these deficits, using insurances as a basic ingredient. In
§ 5 we evaluate the technical feasibility of our design. § 6
concludes our work.
2. Current State of the CA Ecosystem
We compare the current numbers from Certificate
Transparency [17] (CT) and Censys [4] with the numbers
reported by Durumeric et al. [5] in 2013. For CT we
obtained a log of Google’s server [16] Pilot on 2017-
06-30 and removed all certificates that were expired or
not yet valid. We further removed 27 certificates with
invalid UTF-8 entries in their Common Name field. This
resulted in a dataset containing 31, 487, 506 certificates.
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TABLE 1: Top 10 Countries Issuing Certificates – All
values are in percent. The issuer column corresponds to
the respective certificate field.
CT Censys.io Durumeric [5]
Issuer Issuer EV Issuer Issuer
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Korea 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.24
Switzerland 0.09 0.12 0.16 -
France 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.38
Poland 0.13 0.09 0.29 -
Japan 0.14 0.15 2.06 1.06
Italy 0.14 0.09 0.11 -
Germany 0.18 0.17 0.57 0.88
Netherlands 0.22 0.23 3.67 1.32
China 0.37 0.66 0.19 -
Israel 0.38 0.86 0.93 2.56
Belgium 1.55 1.89 4.39 3.29
United Kingdom 16.35 10.8 15.37 10.88
United States 80.11 81.83 69.03 77.55
Sum 99.58 96.99 96.86 98.27
For Censys we used the most recent values as of 2017-06-
30. We only took into account currently valid certificates.
The resulting dataset contained 61, 589, 750 certificates
(+682 % towards 2013).
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the current state of the
CA ecosystem regarding countries and CAs. Towards the
countries issuing certificates the top countries have not
changed. However, the United States further extended their
leading role and now issues over 80 % of all certificates.
The entire market further consolidated and over 95 % of
all certificates are now issued by two to three countries,
while in 2013 ten countries shared 95 %. Moreover, China
is now the country issuing fourth most certificates, while
it was not in the top ten in 2013.
While the distribution among countries is only slightly
changed (see Tab. 1) the issuing CAs changed drastically
(see Tab. 2). The foremost change is that Let’s Encrypt has
a market share of more than 50 %, while it not even existed
in 2013. In addition the former market leader Symantec
Corporation was outperformed by multiple other CAs
especially by its direct competitors COMODO Group and
GoDaddy.com Inc.. At the time of writing it is expected
that Symantec will sell its certificate business to DigiCert
Inc., this will however not change the relation of market
shares. Another major change is that cPanel Inc, Western
Digital Corporation and Amazon Inc. are now among the
top ten issuers.
2.1. Extended Validation Certificates
Extended validation (EV) certificates require a more
rigorous vetting than other certificates. A separate, compa-
rably small market with 637, 911 certificates in the field
(Censys, 2017-09-27) emerged. The countries issuing do-
main validated (DV) certificates are also the major players
in the extended validation market. The top four issuing
countries accounting for 88.79 % are identical. Six major
companies in the DV market also account for 85.96 %
of the issued EV certificates, with DigiCert issuing more
than 50 %. The market is slightly more diverse than the DV
market, however, both are dominated by a single player.
User
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Figure 1: Misaligned Incentives – Choice (solid), money
(dotted), trust / dependency (dashed) and implicit trust
/ dependency (dashdotted) in the CA model (including
extended validation).
3. Technology versus Incentives
In this section we review systemic aspects of the ex-
isting public key certification system and several technical
research proposals meant to augment or replace it.
3.1. General Misalignments
In a well-balanced system, all parties have a choice,
and money and trust flow in the same direction. The reason
simply is that when trust is betrayed, the flow of money
stops. This serves as a disincentive that counters the desire
to betray trust in order to maximize some other influx of
money. For this basic economic mechanism to function
three criteria must be met. First there must be a money flow
that can be altered. Second the money flow must be aligned
to trust such that it can be used as a leverage. The choice
to deny further payment must not be without alternative.
If for example one can not use the entire Internet as a
consequence of money withdraw one practically does not
have leverage.
Consider Fig. 1, which depicts the flow of money,
choice and trust among the players in the CA ecosys-
tem, namely the users who surf the web, the vendors of
browsers, the domain owners, the certificate authorities and
their auditors. Fig. 1 depicts that implicit trust relations
(dashdotted lines) exist that are not aligned with choice or
money flow. As a consequence users do not have a leverage
against misbehaving CAs. More than 200 CAs worldwide
are operative and cam potentially issue rogue certificates.
Towards the browser vendors choice and money of users
are aligned. However, users can, depending on their operat-
ing system, choose from two out of three CA lists (Mozilla,
Microsoft and Apple). As a result the user is practically
very limited in his choice. He thus does not possess a
practical leverage against browser vendors. Domain owners
posses a leverage against the CA that issued their certificate.
This is why CAs offer so called “Protection Plans” for
their certificates, that basically insure that the CA does not
misbehave against its customers. However, there exists an
implicit trust relation with browser vendors (dashdotted
line). This relation is not aligned with choice or money
and as such the domain owner does not have a leverage
here.
3.2. Analysis of Systemic Factors
Klitgaard published a formula to describe the basic me-
chanics of opposing incentives in [14]. His pseudo formula
equates corruption (C) with monopoly (M), discretion
TABLE 2: Top Certificates and Parent Companies – This table combines the top 10 values for all three data sources.
The percent values are summed up for the respective parent company.
Certificate Authority Parent Company Certificate Transparency Censys.io Censys.io EV Durumeric et al. [5]
Amazon Amazon, Inc. 0.48 % 0.38 % - -
COMODO CA Limited COMODO Group 18.21 % 11.12 % 15.37 % 11.80 %
cPanel, Inc. cPanel, Inc. 11.83 % 7.51 % - -
Entrust, Inc. Datacard Group 0.24 % 0.24 % 2.40 %
GeoTrust Inc. DigiCert, Inc. -
thawte, Inc. DigiCert, Inc.
Symantec Corporation DigiCert, Inc. 34.23 %
DigiCert Inc. DigiCert, Inc. 6,46 % 9.79 % 54.77 % 4.19 %
TERENA GEANT Association 0.18 % 0.14 % 3.02 % 1.22 %
GlobalSign nv-sa GMO Internet, Inc. 1.74 % 1.95 % 4.39 % 4.90 %
GoDaddy.com, Inc. GoDaddy.com, Inc. 3.89 % 2.96 % 7.48 % 29.13 %
Network Solutions Web.com Group, Inc. 0.14 % - - 1.81 %
Let’s Encrypt Internet Security Research Group 53.48 % 61.21 % - -
Western Digital Tech. Western Digital Corporation - 1.59 % - -
StartCom Ltd. WoSign CA Limited 0.71 % 1.22 % 0.93 % 2.56 %
Sum 97.21 % 99.09 % 85.96 % 98.65 %
(D) and accountability (A) as follows: C = M +D −A.
Klitgaard initially introduced this formula to describe the
abuse of power, namely corruption. However, in the context
of this paper the formula has to be understood as a
generalized description of tension between incentives. As
we do not imply that any participant is in fact corruptible
we will use the term tension in the following.
Informally, one may affect the level of tension in a sys-
tem by reducing monopoly or discretion, or by increasing
accountability. The three parameters allow us to describe
which parameters a proposed approach alters. Furthermore,
the formula describes the relation between the parameters.
This allows us to evaluate if the values for the parameters
chosen by a proposal are well aligned. If they are not, the
proposal does not fully solve the problem.
At the time of writing, researchers primarily used tech-
nical parameters as an appraisal of the effectiveness of their
proposed solutions, for example, the time to recover from
a certificate breach. With the application of Klitgaard’s
equation the effectiveness of a proposed solution can be
answered from a systemic viewpoint. Currently overlooked
limitations or weaknesses in proposed solutions can be
determined. In what follows, we look at the CA system
by means of these three parameters. Since we do not have
direct indicators of discretion and accountability for the CA
ecosystem, we must infer them from what we know about
the relationships of the market participants as described in
§ 3.1. Please keep in mind that the following description
refers to the basic model of CAs, extensions like Certificate
Transparency are discussed later.
Monopoly. As shown in § 2 the CA ecosystem (DV and
EV) is centralized with one major participant (see Tab. 2).
With the numbers reported by Durumeric et al. [5] in 2013
as starting point this development showcases the formation
of a monopoly. A major factor is that DV certificates
are a digital commodity with practically zero marginal
costs. In combination with the requirement for ubiquitous
encryption the development towards a centralized gratis
market is logical for DV certificates. In fact there is no
mechanism in place to prevent the forming of monopolies
in the DV or EV CA ecosystem.
Discretion. Discretion means that a business entity does
not have to coordinate with or seek approval of another
independent entity when making business decisions. CAs
generally do not need to seek approval of anyone prior to
issue a certificate. Later sanctions for issuing certificates
is covered under accountability.
Accountability. An entity is accountable if another inde-
pendent one oversees it and if it faces a consequence for
misbehavior that is suitable to deter it from misbehaving
repeatedly. Based on an analysis of the version history
of Mozilla’s NSS security module we found that, Mozilla
delisted or distrusted 13 certificates between 2008 and
the mid 2017, however more incidents occurred. On four
occasions, the security of a CA was breached by hackers.
On 193 occasions, a CA issued certificates unauthorized.
On 1614 occasions certificates for not registered domains
where issued. On four occasions, an issued certificate was
in violation of a baseline requirement or policy. None CAs
delisted or distrusted in the aftermath of an incident was
among the top 10 market shareholders. Rather, Mozilla
seeks to delist or distrust certificates as far down the
certification hierarchy as possible in order to minimize
the impact on users [22], [29]. Symantec and its sub-
sidiaries issued hundreds of rogue certificates (including
EV certificates) and were not distrusted but forced to use
Certificate Transparency [21]. Only after another year of
not complying to policies Google and Mozilla laid out a
multi-phase plan to remove Symantec [23]. The bottom
line is that holding top tier CAs accountable is challenging
for other players in the CA ecosystem. In addition the
CA market leader is operated by a consortium including
the major vendors. As such they are essentially their own
watchmen now.
3.3. Application to Existing Work
Approaches of existing work can be described as differ-
ent methods to adjust the parameters monopoly, discretion
and accountability. In the following we group proposals
by the addressed parameter.
Reduction of Monopoly. Distribution of control is used
to reduce monopolies and thus lowers tension. The un-
derlying assumption is that not all controlling entities
are corruptible or that subverting multiple entities is too
difficult or costly. Proposals that rely on the distribution of
control are AKI [13], ARPKI [2], Certificate Cothority [25]
and PoliCert [27]. However, the mechanisms of choice
and trustworthiness remain similar to those in place for
the established CA system. Domain owners select by
market penetration and price, browser vendors select by
market penetration and industry self-regulation criteria,
and users select by convenience, that is, they continue
to follow defaults and vendors’ suggestions. Trust on
First Use (TOFU) and TACK [17] remove third parties
completely and as such monopolies are not a concern.
HSTS Preloading [8] is managed by the browser vendor
who becomes a monopolist, taking into consideration the
limited choice consumers have.
Reduction of Discretion. DANE [9] and Cage [12]
aim at reducing discretion of CAs. The underlying idea
is to restrict CAs so that they can issue certificates for
selected domains only. The necessary policies are either
derived from the existing distribution of certificates (Cage)
or defined by the domain owners, as in DANE. DANE
introduces an additional root of trust. From this root, trust
propagates along the delegations of domains to sponsoring
organizations. VeriSign is the assigned sponsor in the
case of .com domains [10]. Since VeriSign is part of the
Symantec Group (expected to be owned by DigiCert by
2018), a major player in the CA market, the consequential
lack of independence of DANE and the CA market limits
the benefits derived from DANE. Trust on First Use
(TOFU) and TACK [17] remove third parties completely
as such discretion is not existing. HSTS Preloading [8]
is managed by the browser vendor and thus increases
discretion. TOFU and TACK would be ideal from the
perspective of tension resistance but they provide limited
protection in the cases of first-time website visits, loss of
pinning state and, likely, habituation effects due to repeated
acceptance of first-time keys.
Increase of Accountability. Perspectives [28], Con-
vergence [18], Sovereign Keys [7], Certificate Trans-
parency [16], AKI [13], ARPKI [2], PKI Safe Net [26]
and PoliCert [27] all use public logging in one form or
another to make misbehavior of CAs visible. PKI Safe
Net was designed especially to address the too-big-to-fail
problem of major CAs [26]. The design allows to revoke
CAs at specified points in time in order to not break the
entire system. The assumption is that this eases revocation
decisions for browser vendors. All mentioned proposals
assume that the threat of disclosure of misbehavior is
a sufficient deterrent for repeated misbehavior. However,
there is evidence that this is a rather strong assumption in
the case of CAs [1], as we elaborated before in Section 3.2.
4. Connection Insurances for Certification
We introduce the concept of Connection Insurances
(CI). The following description of the system follows a
top down approach first we define and specialize desired
properties and then describe instantiations on the next
detail level. The approach is meant to demonstrate the
orchestration of well understood techniques to achieve the
desired properties, rather than being a final solution. We
especially do not address problems arising from flaws in
the TLS protocol or current implementations in browsers.
The core intent of connection insurance (CI) is that
Internet users, who face the most direct consequences of
rogue certificates, decide for themselves whom to trust
and they benefit from holding their trust anchors account-
able. For sake of simplicity we leave domain owners out,
they can, however, be integrated as proxies for insurance
policies. In order to hold someone accountable some
prerequisites are required: All partners must know each
other, all partners must voluntary agree to the arrangement,
there must be some stakes at risk in case of misbehavior
and all partners must be in the same jurisdiction.
The typical approach is to construct an arrangement
that is enforceable by law, a contract. Using CAs to
authenticate communication partners is a risk mitigation
strategy. If we assume that the risk can not be nullified
there remains a chance of damage to the user. The classical
approach to cope with inevitable risks is delegation and
distribution of the risks, namely an insurance. Based on
this we explored the design space for an insurance backed
system.
An insurance is generally free in its decision what and
who to ensure. As such discretion can not be altered by our
approach. According to the described mechanics (§ 3.2)
we need to keep monopoly low and increase accountability.
The basic idea of insurances is that they are accountable if
an insured event occurs. As such accountability is a basic
property of such an approach. If the user can select from
a variety of insurance companies there is no monopoly.
Based on this idea we seek to construct a system that
allows insurances for authenticity of connections.
In the proposed model users select their anchor of trust,
that is their insurer. As such all partners know each other
and voluntary agree. As users select their issuer they can
select one in the same jurisdiction. As a result the user
can rely on the jurisdiction if a conflict with the insurer
appears. We proceed with a high level description of how
CI work and perform with respect to Klitgaard’s formula.
4.1. Design of Relations
From a security protocol perspective, CI involves the
following parties: A user Alice who visits web sites and
who is insured by an insurer IN. IN maintains a list of
trustworthy certificates. IN gets to know new certificates
by means of application or own search. In either case
a certificate will most likely undergo a harsh vetting
process. This is, as for any insurance, part of the risk
management process of IN. When Alice visits a web
server Bob, information provided by her insurer informs
her whether the certificate CertBob presented by Bob is
trustworthy or not. We additionally assume a legal trusted
third party Judge J who is responsible for settling disputes
between Alice and IN (if one of them misbehaves) and
who enforces legal contracts signed by Alice and IN. We
will say an insurance case occurs if all of the following
events occur at the same time t: Alice connects to Bob’s
web server, Bob’s server presents a certificate CertBob, IN
told Alice that CertBob is trustworthy and CertBob is a
rogue certificate. We say that a certificate is rogue if the
identity in the certificate is not Bob’s. These cases may
occur, for example, if someone: forges a certificate in the
name of a trusted CA or steals a web server’s private key
and subsequently uses the corresponding private key in a
MITM attack on Alice. Our mechanisms prevent case 1
and indemnify Alice in case 2. We do not require that
Alice knows at the time she connects to Bob that CertBob
is rogue but rather that she learns this at some later point in
time t′ > t (for example by E.U. notification requirements
as mentioned in [26]). If an insurance case occurs, we say
that Alice is eligible for compensation or, equivalently, that
IN is liable. If IN is liable then, by contractual arrangement,
IN pays a benefit to Alice. The amounts of premiums and
benefits are determined by the market.
Tension Mechanics. In the following we evaluate for
each party in the system whether they have an incentive
to misbehave. We relay on the introduced mechanics of
tension for our evaluation.
Alice – Alice, as single user, is not in a position of
power regarding the overall market. As such Alice is not
corruptible in terms of our definition.
Bob – Operates his domain. Monopoly: Ø Bob can not
decide about the IN Alice choses. As such there exists no
monopoly nor has Bob discretionary power. Discretion:
Ù This parameter remains untouched. Accountability:
Ú If Bob misbehaves, Alice and IN can hold him
accountable. This is especially to not have any further
business relations. In terms of the tension formula this is an
adequate situation where, without monopoly, accountability
nullifies existing discretion.
Insurer – IN collects rewards and is the trusted third
party for authentication. Monopoly: Ù Customers are
free to choose their trusted parties independently. There is
no system immanent mechanism that limits their choice.
Discretion: Ù This parameter remains untouched. Ac-
countability: Ú The design of our protocols assures that
customers can demonstrate their insurance claims rigor-
ously to a judge. There is no system immanent mechanism
that supports monopolies. Discretion is not changed as
described in (§ 4). However, accountability is increased
what nullifies the existing discretion. Based on introduced
mechanics this constellation prevents tension.
Vendor – Vendors including the current CA list into their
product are not involved in the decision making process
in CI.
Judge – We assume that judge, in the form of judiciary,
has an intrinsic motivation to be honest and fair.
4.2. Threat Model
Our system is designed to protect Alice and her in-
surance provider IN from misbehavior of each other. In
particular, it provides CI to Alice: If the insurer promised
Alice that certificate C is trustworthy at time t and Alice
established a connection to a web server who presented C
at time t then Alice can provide convincing evidence of this
fact to a judge. Since we require that Alice’s evidence is
convincing this also protects IN from fraud (that is, Alice
cannot falsely claim that an insurance case occurred).
Additionally, our system provides reselling protection
(RP) to the insurer. Without RP, Alice may sell her policy
file to a third party, say, Charlie. This does not extend
Alice’s coverage to Charlie but it provides Charlie with
protection against certificate substitutions. This results in
a free-riding problem for the insurance market. While we
cannot prevent Alice from sharing information she receives
from the insurer we can assure that this information is not
convincing to a third party: Alice cannot convince others
that her insurer considers a certificate to be trustworthy
without explicit interaction of her insurer. At first sight, CI
and RP appear contradictory. However, the contradiction
can be resolved by using Chameleon signatures [15] in
lieu of conventional signatures.
In an interactive protocol between Alice and her insurer
there may be situations where one party benefits from
deviating from the protocol. In general, we allow Alice to
attempt fraud and to abort protocol instances. We require
that the insurer does not abort the protocol, though (for
example by denying one of the signatures in Certificate
List Download below). The insurer may however refuse
payment of benefits and may prepare such a refusal by
sending crafted messages. In summary, we accept that
Alice may be malicious, but require the insurer runs the
protocol to completion.
4.3. Insurance System
In what follows, we succinctly explain the protocols
we designed to support CI. The goal of our construction is
to demonstrate that CI can be implemented using well-
understood cryptographic techniques. We begin with a
simplified version of CI, which lacks privacy, efficiency
and reselling protection but is easy to understand. We add
said properties subsequently.
Alice initially receives a list of (trusted) certificates
from her insurance provider and keeps the list up to date
by checking regularly for updates. Whenever she connects
to a web server she creates a voucher that the server signs.
Before Alice updates her certificate list she submits the
accumulated vouchers (one per domain) to her insurance
provider and receives a receipt for the submission. If one
of her trusted certificates is compromised then she presents
the corresponding voucher and receipt to her insurer and
claims the insurance benefit. We now describe the details
of the scheme.
Our scheme uses a public key signature scheme Π,
a collision resistant hash function h and a cryptographic
hash function H modeled as random oracle. We write
σA(m) to denote a signature of A on m where A may be
a name (for example, Alice) or a certificate. If we write
σA(m,m
′) then this implies that m and m′ are padded to
suitable lengths and concatenated afterwards.
Insurance Provider Setup – In order to set up service,
the insurer creates a signature key pair (pkIN, skIN) and
assembles an initial list of certificates C := (Cert1, . . . )
that it believes to be authentic.
User registration – In order to subscribe to the insurer’s
service, Alice creates a signature key pair (pkA, skA) and
her insurer generates a unique customer number for Alice.
For simplicity we equate this number with Alice. The
insurance contract between Alice and her insurer includes
the public keys (pkIN,pkA) of both, the customer number
of Alice, the contract’s validity term (t0, tend) and an upper
bound ∆T on the time between certificate updates. If Alice
does not update her certificates within the bound then she
forfeits her coverage until the next update occurs. Both
parties must agree to the contract in a legally binding way.
Certificate List Download – The certificate list download
marks the beginning of an update cycle. The insurer sends
a list of certificates C and a randomly generated cycle
identifier ccid to Alice. Alice computes a signature on
ccid, C, a timestamp t and her customer number and sends
the signature to the insurer. The insurer verifies Alice’s
signature, checks that the timestamp is recent and replies
with a signature of the same message.
As we will see later, the insurer has to make sure it
issues a unique ccid to Alice. Reusing a ccid would enable
Alice to claim compensation for a previously issued list
of certificates. If ccid is randomly chosen and sufficiently
long, say 256 bit, the probability of reusing a previous ccid
is negligible.
Voucher Submission – The voucher submission marks the
end of an update cycle and occurs right before the begin-
ning of the next certificate list download. Alice assembles
a list of vouchers V and sends the hash value h(V ) and
a timestamp t′ to the insurer together with a signature of
these values, the current cycle identifier and her customer
number. Her insurance provider checks the signature, that
the timestamp is recent and that Alice did not violate the
update interval requirement. The insurer then replies with
a signature of the same message. Our simplified scheme
requires that Alice and the insurer store all messages and
signatures exchanged in each cycle.
Creating Vouchers – A voucher provides evidence of the
fact that Alice established a connection to Bob’s server
at bob.example.org whose certificate CertBob was
included in certificate listC in update cycle ccid. Alice com-
putes vouchers as follows: she generates a fresh random
value r, sets v := 〈Alice,bob.example.org, ccid, r〉
and calculates H(v). She sends H(v) to Bob who replies
with a signature σBob(H(v)). Alice stores the tuple Vch :=
〈CertBob, v, σBob(H(v))〉 where Vch is her voucher.
Ordinary web servers are not aware of this protocol.
However, during an TLS ephemeral key exchange servers
sign a client-chosen random_bytes value, where we
can put a randomized version of H(v).
Demonstrating Insurance Cases – Assume that Bob’s cer-
tificate CertBob turns out to be rogue, that Alice connected
to Bob’s server, that Alice received CertBob and that Alice
wishes to claim a benefit for this case. In order to support
her claim, Alice has to prove three things: 1) CertBob was
in the certificate list C in cycle ccid, 2) Alice updated
her certificate list in time, and 3) Alice connected to
Bob’s server in cycle ccid. Alice proves the first two items
by disclosing certificate list C, cycle id ccid timestamps
t, t′ and the signatures σIN(Alice, “Certificates”, ccid, t, C)
and σIN(Alice, “Vouchers”, ccid, t′, h(V )) issued by IN in
cycle ccid. Verifying that CertBob ∈ C is straightforward.
Updates were timely if t′ − t ≤ ∆T . The evidence
is convincing because IN chose a unique cycle id ccid
and Alice cannot compute the signatures herself without
breaking the signature scheme. Neither can Alice reuse
signatures issued to another customer because signatures
of the insurer include unique customer numbers.
In order to prove the third item, Alice discloses the
voucher list V that matches hash value h(V ) and the
corresponding voucher Vch. Verifying that Vch ∈ V is
straightforward. The proof is convincing because Alice
would have to forge a valid signature of Bob or find a
collision in one of the hash functions h or H in order
to compute the evidence herself. Since v includes her
customer number she cannot reuse a voucher from another
customer.
4.4. Optimizations
In the simplified scheme, Alice discloses her entire list
of vouchers in order to claim compensation. This leaks
connection information to the insurer. Also, our description
above does not yet offer reselling protection as described
before and is not very efficient in terms of storage, in that
both Alice and her insurer have to remember the details
of sent and received signatures.
Voucher Privacy. In the simplified scheme, Alice dis-
closes her entire list of vouchers in order to claim compen-
sation. This leaks connection information to the insurer.
We can solve this problem by making h(V ) the root of a
Merkle tree. In order to prove that a voucher is a leaf `
of the tree, Alice discloses the path from the root to `.
This still leaks the order of ` in V and the size of V . We
can avoid this leakage by making the size of V equal to the
size of C. Note that |C| is an upper bound of |V |. Alice
simply pads V to the size of C using pseudorandomly
generated vouchers and randomizes the order in V . She
does not have to store the entire padded tree because she
can recreate it at any time from a randomly chosen seed.
Reselling Protection. The simplified scheme allows Alice
to resell her certificate list to others. All she needs to do is
disclose C, t, ccid, her customer number and the signature
of the insurer. If Alice does not want to disclose the
signature than she can still prove in zero-knowledge that
she knows a valid signature. This is sufficient to convince
third parties that the insurer considers the certificates in
C valid and authentic. In order to remove this property,
we require that Alice and the insurer use a Chameleon
signature scheme [15] in lieu of a regular signature scheme.
Chameleon signature schemes have the property that Alice
can convince herself that the insurer signed a message but
she cannot convince others that the insurer is the signer
because Alice could have forged the signature herself.
The construction in [15] makes use of a Chameleon hash
function H(·, ·) in combination with a regular signature
scheme.
In order to uncover forgeries, the insurer is now re-
quired to record all messages signed in this fashion. If the
insurer uses an authenticated channel to send this message
or the certificate list to Alice then the authentication must
be deniable. Otherwise, Alice can use a transcript of the
communication in lieu of regular signatures in order to
convince third parties about the authenticity of the certifi-
cate list. A technicality of the Chameleon construction is
that Alice must prove knowledge of a trapdoor information
(τ ) when signing the contract with the insurer [15] (see
also [11]). Otherwise, Alice may employ a notary to create
the Chameleon hash function for her (without disclosing
τ ).
Storage Efficiency. We can reduce Alice’s storage require-
ments as follows. Instead of storing C for every cycle,
Alice only stores the up-to-date certificate list C and keeps
a log of changes to preceding updates. More precisely, let
Ci be the certificate list after the i-th update cycle. The
update log consists of a list of roll-back functions ∆(·, ·)
that, given Ci, output ∆(Ci, i) = Ci−1. If some Cj expired
(because the policy term does not cover it any longer) then
the corresponding roll-back functions can be deleted.
Integration with TLS. We focus on the ephemeral key
exchange methods DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA in RFC 5246
because DH_anon does not authenticate the server and
the non-ephemeral key exchange methods do not provide
forward secrecy. The TLS 1.2 handshake begins with a
ClientHello message from the client to the server.
This message contains a field called random_bytes
with 28 bytes that the client chooses. The server replies
with a ServerKeyExchange message containing a
signed structure called signed_params. This structure
contains the random values from random_bytes that
the client chose before. When Alice visits Bob’s web-
site she sets random_bytes to H(v). After receiv-
ing this message from Bob, she extracts the signature
signed_params and stores the result.
4.5. Related Models
Other researchers have suggested before that the cer-
tification of keys should be tied to insurances. Reiter et
al. [24] made this the basis of an authentication metric.
The authors draw analogies to the reinsurance business
but their work remains theoretical and focused on metrics.
More recently, Matsumoto and Reischuk [19] made
a case for tying certificates with insurances as a means
to improve the accountability of CAs. The model they
propose differs from ours in crucial aspects. Matsumoto
and Reischuk suggest that customers (browsers) hold CAs
accountable for the issuance of rogue certificates. As a
consequence, CAs are required to pay an insurance benefit
to the domain owners whose domain was the subject of
the rogue certificate. While we aim to insure the end user.
5. Technical Feasibility
The technical feasibility depends on three parameters,
connection overhead, performance overhead and storage
requirements. Where the last said is the most important as
usage of local storage is the main technical difference com-
pared to existing approaches. The actual TLS connection
remains unchanged as such there is no direct connection
overhead. There is an additional connection for the first
occurrence of a certificate in an update cycle, this however,
amortizes over time. In terms of computation overhead one
signature creation and one signature validation per update
cycle are required. As such these overhead amortizes over
time as well. We implemented Chameleon signatures in
the Go programming language and ran benchmarks on a
MacBook Pro 2012 (Mac OS X 10.11.3, 2.7 GHz Intel
Core i7, 16 GB). It took ≈ 0.4 ms to compute on average
and verifying them took ≈ 0.5 ms on average. As such
even the delay for the initial connection is below human
perceptibility and hence we predict that an introduction
would not be noticeable to users.
Storage requirements. In what follows, we estimate the
amount of storage that insurers and their customers need
in order to run the CI system. Both need to store the
generated vouchers and users need to store encountered
certificates. In the absence of better approaches we rely
on existing statistics of parameters that we cannot easily
collect ourselves. We define that informations must be
stored for 365 days this definition is based on the fact that
the average time to fix a 0-day exploit is 321 days [3].
All encountered certificates n, with average size scert
must be stored for d times. Where d equates as d =
365/k where k is the average validity time of certifi-
cates. Thus the required storage capacity ccert equates
as c = n · scert · (365/k − 1) ≈ 2.7 GB/year. n = 5 · 105
websites generate 97 % of global e-commerce revenue [20].
We use this as an upper bound to the number of different
domains a user visits. scert = 1.90 kB: Based on the
dataset described in § 2 ≈ 95 % of all certificates were
smaller than 1.90 kilobytes. k = 90: Based on the dataset
described in § 2 we found that ≈ 53 % of all certificates
are valid 90 days.
All created vouchers v of size svoucher need to be
stored for one year. v = 2, 500: By analyzing 1 million
web sites in January 2016, Englehardt [6] recently observed
that only 123 third party domains are present on more than
1 % of sites. We first selected the Alexa top 200 and found
in summary less than 1000 domains. The absolute number
increased when selecting 200 sites at random, but still
giving on average 1000 (ranging from 920 to 1070 in 20
repetitions). When counting subdomains separately, the
number increased to 2426 for the set of Alexa top 200
web pages, and to 1912 on average for randomly selected
sites (ranging from 1578 to 2103 in 20 repetitions). In
summary, between 1000 and 2500 certificates seem to be
a reasonably estimate of the number of certificates Internet
users encounter per day on average. We have no means
to estimate how long an insurer would want a cycle to
be but 1 day seems reasonable. Therefore v = 2, 500 for
the customer. svoucher: The required structures require
1, 700 bytes per voucher for the customer and 512 bytes
for the insurer. There are 128 additional bytes per update
cycle. cvoucher: For the customer 2, 500 · 1, 700 + 128 ·
24 ≈ 0.58 GB/year. We assume that insurers have about
44 million customers (the total number of car insurances of
the largest car insurer in the U.S.). This leads to a storage
requirement of 512 · 24 · 365 · (44 · 106) ≈ 180 TB/year.
Despite our conservative estimates (60 minutes update
cycles, 5 · 105 websites, 2, 500 Certificates), the storage
overhead for users is reasonable, given the amounts of
storage typically available on contemporary devices. We
overestimated the required storage of insurers as well.
Still, our conservative estimate appears reasonable, given
current storage prices. Therefore, we conclude that CI is
feasible from a storage perspective for both insurers and
their customers.
6. Conclusion
The success of Let’s Encrypt transformed the certificate
market into a gratis market. Therefore the structure of
competitors changed since the last review of the market in
2013. We argue that relying the security of the entire World
Wide Web on just a hand full of companies rooted in a
single country is potentially critical. Currently corporations
are serving us well. However, there is no system inherent
reason for this. Corporations are solely driven by the need
to make money. Currently making money is aligned with
a good user experience, that includes secure connections.
But this alignment is not part of the system design itself,
there is no general penalty if security is not the primary
focus. Moreover, recent political events like the last US
presidential election or the Brexit in Europe (some 90 %+
of certificates are issued in these two countries) made clear
that the status quo is not immutable.
In a considerable body of work, researchers pointed
out shortcomings and failures of the CA ecosystem and
made suggestions how it may be improved at a technical
level. By applying a notion for the alignment of incentives
we teased out immanent problems of the system, though.
We especially showed that existing work overlooked the
incentives of participants in the system. We showed that
the parameters monopoly, discretion and accountability
can be used to identify the system immanent incentives.
Based thereof, we argue that technical improvements alone
are insufficient to address the inherent problems of the CA
ecosystem. Consequently, we explored new directions for
establishing a trust ecosystem.
Towards this end, we proposed a model that we call
Connection Insurances. This model puts users into the
center of the system and enables them to source pub-
lic key information from insurers they choose and trust
and who are willing to commit to the authenticity of
the information they provide. In cases of misbehavior,
users are able to prove their claims in a court of law
and are eligible to collect benefits. Our model decreases
monopoly while increasing accountability. In our analysis
and evaluation, we found that our proposal is feasible in
terms of computational and storage requirements. Overall,
we believe that our model offers ample opportunity for
further investigation and we hope that our first steps inspire
other researchers to come up with improvements.
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